This paper examines, in the context of a multiple types of consumers, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions under which equilibrium and optimum exist, and involve mixing types of consumers in jurisdictions. Pricing includes visa permits for entry. Following Berglas (1976), we assume anonymous crowding and complementarities in production. For a large economy, we prove existence of equilibrium and the first and second welfare theorems. Our simultaneous optimization approach provides a new technique for showing existence of equilibrium in local public good economies with local production and a continuum of agents.
Introduction
Tiebout (1956) claimed that in a model with local public goods and many jurisdictions (among other conditions), equilibrium will feature sorting of consumers by type and that the resulting allocation will be e¢ cient. Twenty years later, Berglas (1976) proposed a frictionless production Tiebout economy, where private goods are produced within each community by means of its labor inputs, dropping in this way the unnecessary and unrealistic assumption of "no restrictions due to employment opportunities" from the Tiebout model. In an anonymous crowding scenario (the consumers care only about the level of congestion of the public goods and not about the identities of the other individuals making use of them), Berglas showed that if individuals di¤er in their productive skills (teachers, accountants, unskilled workers, etc.), the distributions of tastes for public goods and labor skills are independent, and labor skills in a community are complementary, then individuals may become better o¤ forming mixed communities rather than sorting into homogeneous communities.
Berglas'purpose was to analyze the formation of mixed communities, its ef…ciency, and the associated tax structures. However, Berglas (1976) did not demonstrate existence of equilibrium and his existence conjecture was subject to Bewley's (1981) criticism. The issue of the existence of equilibrium was also left aside in the subsequent literature that analyze the formation of mixed communities (see, for example, Bartolome (1990) , Benabou (1993) , McGuire (1991) , and Schwab and Oates (1991) ). Those models su¤er from several shortcomings that prevent the study of the existence of equilibrium. In particular, the approach through di¤erential techniques is inappropriate when considering the population and locations as discrete sets. This well known "integer problem" was …rst analyzed by Pauly (1970) and Wooders (1978) , and concisely summarized by Starrett (1988) . Proving existence of equilibrium is a fundamental step that must be done before aiming at any normative and empirical test of the model. Otherwise, equilibrium may fail to exist, suggesting that the equations that describe the model are not consistent with each other.
Being inspired by Berglas'(1976) work, we propose an alternative general equilibrium model that incorporates Berglas'main assumptions: anonymous crowding, di¤erent labor skills among individual types, and labor complementarities in the production of private goods. Although our model is di¤erent from Berglas (1976), we recognize his pioneering work on this subject, and for this reason, We consider a world whose population splits into city districts, municipalities, villages, and counties, and not into countries with a "big"size. 1 For the Berglas economy proposed here, our main formal goal is to demonstrate that heterogeneous Tiebout communities exist and are optimal in equilibrium. To obtain this result we need to identify the conditions under which 1) equilibrium exists, 2) the set of equilibria is equivalent to the core, and 3) the core involves mixing types of consumers in jurisdictions. Our descriptive and normative analysis of heterogeneous mixed communities is important in the following respects. First, the analysis refutes Bewley's (1981, p. 725, 733 ) argument against the possibility of extending Tiebout's analysis to include heterogeneous communities. Second, only by bringing job opportunities into Tiebout's model can we properly understand the pricing characteristics of a market of visa permits. 2 Third, we demonstrate that Tiebout's theory does not speak against the empirical evidence that analyzes heterogeneous communities in places that o¤er both public goods and industries to work with (see, for example, Roback (1982) ).
Our proof of existence of equilibrium is novel, di¤erent from the previous core decentralization approach (see Wooders (1978) , Conley and Wooders (1997) , and ACW (2009)) and the non-excess demand approach (see EGSZ (1999) ). Here, we follow a simultaneous optimization approach. For this, we construct a generalized game for our atomless local public goods and production economy, prove that this game has an equilibrium in pure strategies, and then show that such equilibrium is, in fact, a price taking equilibrium for a Berglas economy. This proof constitutes by itself a contribution to the clubs / local public goods literature. For pedagogical reasons, we explain in Section 5 the di¤erence between these three approaches and also the new subtleties that this third approach has for these types of economies (local public goods, continuum of consumers, puri…- 1 Big cities such as London or New York are thought of as conglomerates of jurisdictions, such as Knightsbridge (London) or Soho (New York). Both are clear examples of jurisdictions with heterogeneous consumers (heterogeneity in their income levels, productive skills and preferences). 2 Some countries, such as the U.K., are considering selling visa permits to enter the country to work there.
cation of equilibrium).
The literature on community composition coming after Tiebout's tale has been extensive. It is well established (Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) ) that communities should be taste-homogenous if crowding types are exogenous and crowding is anonymous. Non-anonymous crowding (consumers have preferences for the other types of consumers with whom they wish to share a jurisdiction)
allowed Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) , ACW (2009), and EGSZ (1999, 2006) to recover heterogeneity in the community composition. We depart from these papers in that we show that heterogeneous communities exist and are optimal in a context of anonymous crowding and exogenous crowding types if a local collaborative production technology is added into the picture.
To our knowledge, Conley and Wooders (2001) and Konishi (2010) are the only exceptions in the theoretical literature that obtains optimal taste-heterogeneous jurisdictions in a context of anonymous crowding. However, both models differ from the present one. On the one hand, Conley and Wooders (2001) obtain heterogeneity in community composition through di¤erent agents'genetic endowments and endogenous crowding types (through educational choices). Although these authors discuss the need to drop Tiebout's assumption of "no restriction due to labor opportunities", their model does not incorporate a private production sector associated with a jurisdiction, nor does it touch the point of how labor complementarities induce agents to sort into heterogeneous communities. Konishi (2010) , on the other hand, addresses the issue of existence of heterogeneous clubs in a context of anonymous crowding. However, even if his result seems similar to ours, the source of heterogeneity is totally di¤erent. There, mixed clubs result and are e¢ cient if clubs have multiple facilities (e.g., gym and swimming pool) with economies of scope, whereas in the present paper heterogeneous communities arise due to the labor complementarities in the production of a jurisdiction industry.
Our model captures the "group composition problem"pointed out by Berglas (1976). In our setting, each jurisdiction o¤ers both public goods and a speci…c industry. 3 Therefore, wages are both type and jurisdiction speci…c. This implies that the jurisdiction-type speci…c wage rate results in di¤erent wages among 3 The comparison between jurisdictions with di¤erent production technologies and supply of public goods captures the profound debate in the economic policy arena: more versus less market oriented economies, e.g., Silicon Valley (California, U.S.A.) versus Keilaniemi, the basement of Nokia (Espoo, Finland), respectively.
the di¤erent individuals of the jurisdiction. This treatment of production differs from Wooders (1978) , who makes production dependent only on the size of the jurisdiction. Also, the assumption of a jurisdiction speci…c industry departs from Benabou (1993) , who models production as a citywide activity (same industry for several jurisdictions). We introduce no contractual problems into the model (skills are observable and adverse selection problems are ruled out). 4 Our attention is primarily oriented toward the properties of societal strati…cation.
Another related paper is Konishi (2008) , which models a Tiebout economy with entrepreneurs, where communities have an associated exogenous wage in each jurisdiction. In that paper, communities are homogeneously populated as a consequence of the imposition of a zoning constraint that makes crowding e¤ects anonymous. In our paper we take the standard assumption of a complete price system for the set of jurisdiction types (thus, entrepreneurs are absent). We also depart from Konishi (2008) in that we make the production technology and wages endogenously dependent on the pro…le of worker types in a jurisdiction.
This further step is crucial for the study of the di¤erent possible patterns of community composition. The idea is that if the private production in a jurisdiction is collaborative (e.g., Leontie¤ or Cobb-Douglas) and pays high wages, then the individuals will prefer to group into a heterogeneous community, once the pattern of community composition …ts with the labor complementarities required in the production sector. This result holds true in an anonymous crowding framework.
Our work also bears some relationship to that of EGSZ (2006) 
Berglas'model reformulated
Our economy is as follows. Trade of private goods occurs in international markets (as in Berglas (1976, Section 5) , where intercommunity trade is allowed for).
However, to have access to the consumption of the public goods a consumer must belong to a jurisdiction, and for that the consumer has to acquire a visa permit (or jurisdiction membership). The visa also allows the consumer to work in the jurisdiction industry, and thus to obtain a wage.
The set of private goods is L = f1; :::; l; :::; Lg : The corresponding price vector
There is a …nite number of indivisible public projects, in the sense of Mas-Colell (1980) . A public project consists of a discrete set of public goods (e.g., schools and parks). The set of public projects is denoted by G = f1; :::; g; :::; Gg :
There is also a …nite set of production technologies Y = f1; :::; y; :::; Y g. The characteristics of these production technologies will be speci…ed below.
In what follows, all of Berglas' (1976) assumptions start with B. Other assumptions needed to assure existence of equilibrium start with A.
Assumption B1: Each public project g 2 G has an associated cost c(g) 2 R L + in terms of private goods.
Assumption B1 says that for each public good (recall that there is a …nite number of public goods), there is an associated cost in terms of private goods (and only in terms of private goods). This is a Leontie¤ type of production technology, where for each type of public good g 2 G the amount of private goods inputs is pre-determined. This assumption is also present in earlier works (see EGSZ (1999) and Konishi (2008) ). The next assumption is required in order to avoid non-convexities associated with the consumers'choice problem.
Assumption A1 (Large economy): The set of consumers is a nonatomic …nite measure space (H; H; ), where H is a -algebra of subsets of H and is the associated Lebesgue measure.
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A consumer's type is a complete description of his endowments, membership characteristics, and preferences (each is described below). Utility function: Consumers have preferences de…ned over the consumption of private goods x 2 R L + ; the consumption of the public project g 2 G, and its associated level of congestion, denoted by n 2 N + (a natural number). Preferences are represented by the utility functionũ h (x; g; n): This utility is decreasing in the level of congestion. If no public project is o¤ered in a jurisdiction, the congestion is assumed to be irrelevant. 6 Also, we assume that consumer h 's utilityũ h ( ; g; n) is continuous, strictly monotonic, and quasiconcave. A standard assumption in the club / local public goods literature, which is also present in Berglas (1973) , is the following.
Assumption B2: For all h of the same type ,ũ h (x; g; n) =ũ (x; g; n).
As pointed out in Section 5, Assumption B2 can be relaxed by allowing consumers of the same type to have di¤erent preferences on the consumption of private goods.
Jurisdictions and visa permits:
A jurisdiction type ! is described by the membership characteristics of its community and its organizational charac- 5 By z 2 R L ++ we mean that all coordinates of the vector z are strictly positive real numbers, whereas by z 2 R L + we mean that all coordinates of the vector z are non-negative real numbers. 6 That is, 8(n; n 0 ) with n 6 = n 0 ;ũ h (x; ;; n) =ũ h (x; ;; n 0 ), where ; means that there is no public project:
7 teristics (in EGSZ (2006) terminology). The organization characteristics of a jurisdiction ! are its o¤er of public project, denoted by g ! 2 G; the production technology (described below) associated with the jurisdiction industry, denoted by y ! 2 Y; and the pro…le of consumers (n ! ) 2 , where n ! 2 N denotes the number of type consumers in a jurisdiction type !. The public project has an associated level of congestion n ! = P 2 n ! . Thus, a jurisdiction type is characterized by a policy package ! (g ! ; y ! ; n ! 2 ):
For all our analysis, we assume that consumers care only about the level of congestion of the public goods and not about the identities of the other individuals making use of the public goods.
Assumption B3 (Anonymous crowding): For every consumer h 2 H and any pair of jurisdictions ! = (g ! ; y ! ; (n ! ) 2 ) and! = (g!; y!; n ! 2 ) with g ! = g! and P n ! = P n ! , but n ! 6 = n ! for some consumer types 2 , we haveũ
The set of possible jurisdiction types is = f1; :::; !; :::; g : Notice that the set is …nite, since the sets of consumers'types, public projects, and production technologies are …nite. Without loss of generality, we refer to a type ! jurisdiction by !: The following assumption guarantees that each jurisdiction is negligible with respect to the whole economy.
Assumption A2: Each jurisdiction has a …nite number of consumers.
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A consequence of imposing assumptions A1 and A2 is that the continuum of consumers splits into …nitely populated jurisdictions, 8 and therefore there will be a continuum of jurisdictions.
By acquiring a visa permit (or membership), a consumer gains access to the jurisdiction, so that he can consume its public goods and work in the jurisdiction industry. The visa is consumer-type ( ) and jurisdiction-type (!) speci…c. We denote it by m = ( ; !): The set of visas is denoted by M: A list is a function : M ! f0; 1; :::g where ( ; !) represents the number of visas of type ( ; !): We 7 The assumption of …nitely populated coalitions in an economy with a continuum of consumers is standard in the literature (see Kaneko and Wooders (1986) 
b) each consumer chooses at most one membership, i.e., P 
seen as the consumer h 's restricted consumption set of visa permits compatible with his private consumption.
The aggregate membership-( ; !) vector is given by^
We now impose a measurement requirement on^ 2 R M , which requires consistent matching of consumers in terms of the aggregate of choices. 9 We say that the aggregate membership vector^ 2 R M is consistent if for every jurisdiction type ! 2 there is a real number (!) such that^ ( ; !) = (!)n ! ; 8 2 :
Here, (!) is read as the "number"of type ! jurisdictions. The choice function
is consistent. We write Cons f^ 2 R M :^ is consistentg: Observe also that under this condition the proportions that hold in a type ! jurisdiction are maintained once we integrate over the existing jurisdictions of this type, that is,
Also, the relative proportions of consumer types in a 9 See also Kaneko and Wooders (1986) and EGSZ (1999, 2006). 9 jurisdiction ! are maintained.
A visa permit m = ( ; !) gives access to the consumption of the public project g ! 2 G (with an associated level of congestion n): Thus, we can write consumer h 's utility function as a function of the consumption of private goods and jurisdiction membership, i.e., u h :
10 The utility mapping (h ; x; ) ! u h (x; ) is a jointly measurable function of all its arguments.
Jurisdiction industry: Following Berglas (1976), the production of private goods requires only labor (a body of consumers of di¤erent types engaged in the production activity). 11 In particular, the production correspondence y 2 Y maps labor inputs (ii) 0 2 y(( ) 2 ) (i.e., no set of consumers is forced to produce), (iii) y is di¤erentiable in labor inputs ( ) 2 , and (iv) every y 2 Y exhibits a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology.
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For each jurisdiction type ! there is a speci…c private production technology
We consider an economy where the amount of labor contracts available in the jurisdiction industries coincides with the individuals'demand for jurisdictions (in equilibrium). Thus, if in equilibrium a jurisdiction has a pro…le n ! 2 , then there will be n ! units of labor of type available in this jurisdiction industry, and therefore, the production of a type ! jurisdiction evaluated at the pro…le
The wage that a type consumer obtains in a type ! jurisdiction is denoted by ! 2 R + . In equilibrium, the consumer's wage equals his marginal productivity in the jurisdiction industry (in our generalized game this is assured by allowing a …ctitious auctioneer to mimic the competitive market solution of a production economy). Wages are thus a funciton of prices p: 10 The optimization problem with this new form of utility corresponds to Stages 1 and 2 of the generalized game in Section 6.
11 A model where production is a function of both labor inputs and physical capita would
give us no further insights on the group composition problem, and is thus omited. 12 See Freeman (1996) and Mookherjee and Ray (2010) for the consequences on inequality of considering a di¤erent production technology.
Notice that a CRS production technology implies that wages are homogeneous of degree zero in the labor inputs, which in turn implies that the marginal productivity depends on the proportions of consumer types in the jurisdiction.
Therefore, in our context, it is legitimate to write the wages as a function of the pro…le of proportions, i.e., ! (p; ! ); 8 2 : This parameterization is the …nal justi…cation of assuming a …nite number of consumer types, as the community composition can be easily described in terms of proportions.
Pricing: Consumers must pay personalized lump-sum taxes in order to cover the cost of providing the public project g ! o¤ered by a jurisdiction !: In particular, a type consumer will pay a transfer t ! in jurisdiction ! and a poll
The poll fees, common to all consumers in the jurisdiction, cover the costs pc(g ! ) of providing the public project g ! . The transfers t ! 2 R can be positive, negative, or zero, as transfers internalize the externalities among the consumers in the jurisdiction, given their tastes for the public goods. Consumers' types are observable and thus all consumers of the same type in the same jurisdiction type ! pay the same transfer t ! . We say that t ! 2 R is a pure transfer system in jurisdiction ! if t ! 2 Trans; where
The consumer's budget constraint associated with his choice of jurisdiction
The budget constraint BC h (!) says that the sum of the cost of the commodities purchased px h and the tax t ! + p ! required to …nance the cost of the public goods of the jurisdiction must be less than or equal to the type-and-jurisdictionspeci…c-wage ! that the consumer obtains by working in the jurisdiction industry, and the income obtained from selling the consumer's endowments of private goods.
Consumers of a given type can be required to satisfy some capital provision in order to acquire a certain jurisdiction membership. Let us think of this commodity as land and denote it byl 2 L. Land can be acquired in the market by any agent, but only those consumers with this land requirement have the obligation to accommodate it in their consumption bundles. That is, for a consumer
holdsg be the indirect utility of a consumer h with a membership in a jurisdiction type !;
given the prices p; t ! ; ! , and ! :
Equilibrium: We consider the notion of a price-taking equilibrium (prices precede maximization) as an e¢ cient summary of the equilibrium corresponding to a competitive theory of jurisdictions.
De…nition 1: An equilibrium for this Berglas economy consists of a vector of bundles and memberships (x; ) and prices (p; t; ; ) such that:
No pro…ts in the provision of public goods:
No pro…ts in the production of private goods:
(E.4) Market clearing for private goods:
The following assumption ("Desirability of endowments") is needed in order to assure that the weak core and the strong core coincide (we refer to EGSZ (1999) for the distinction between both concepts). Our Assumption A4 di¤ers slightly from EGSZ (2006) in that here we address the possibility that some visas may require some consumers to satisfy some minimum consumption of capital.
Assumption A4 (Endowments are desirable): For every consumer h 2 H and every consumption choice (x
k, where k 0 stands for the capital requirement of membership h :
The last remaining assumption (A5) is needed in order to prevent the "minimum expenditure situation" (see EGSZ (1999) for an example where a quasiequilibrium fails to be an equilibrium in an economy where the private goods are used as inputs for the production of public projects). Let us …rst introduce the following de…nitions. The pair (x; ) is said to be a feasible state for a measurable set H H if (x; ) 2 X h satis…es the budget constraints for each h 2 H and, for the set of consumers H, conditions (E.4) and (E.5) hold. Now let l 0 be a vector in R L + consisting of one unit of the l 0 commodity and nothing else.
the set of private goods and x h l = 0 for all l 2L and almost all consumers h 2 H, then for almost all consumers h 2 H there exists r > 0 and l
We say that our economy is jurisdiction irreducible if every feasible allocation is jurisdiction linked.
Assumption A5: Our economy is jurisdiction irreducible.
Results
Theorem 1 (Existence): Let assumptions A1-A5 and B1-B3 hold for this
Berglas economy. Then, there exists an equilibrium.
In Section 5 we explain the novel aspects of our simultaneous optimization approach for proving Theorem 1 and the main di¤erences with earlier proofs (core decentralization approach (see Conley and Wooders (1997) and ACW (2009)) and non-excess demand approach (see EGSZ (1999) ). In Section 6 we present the generalized game and the proof.
In our next result we establish the core equivalence theorem for our economy.
Let us …rst introduce the following de…nitions. We say that (x; ) is in the core if there is no subset of H H with (H) > 0 and a feasible state (x;~ ) for H
h for all types 2 and all h 2 H, and
) is Pareto optimal if there is no feasible state
h for almost all h 2 H and
The following assumption is needed in order to guarantee that every core state can be supported as an equilibrium. It requires that, for every jurisdiction type ! = (g ! ; y ! ; n ! 2 ), (i) the pro…le of consumers n ! 2 satis…es the optimal 13 This is read as follows: if the entire social endowment of private goods is used to produce public projects, then, for almost every consumer h 2 H and every 2 ; there exists some good l 0 = 2L and some su¢ ciently large level of consumption of this good such that every agent would prefer to consume his endowment together with this large level of good l 0 , and belong to no jurisdiction, rather than to consume the bundle x h in the jurisdiction membership h ( ; !):
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proportions ! that maximize the CRS production technology y ! ; and (ii) the positive measure (!) is absolutely continuous with respect to the measure .
For the latter assumption let us …rst de…ne the set of consumers with membership m = ( ; !) byĤ ! = fh 2 H : h ( ; !) = 1; 8 g, and denote byĤ ! a subset of H ! for which^ is consistent, i.e.,Ĥ ! = fh 2Ĥ ! : 9 (!) s.t.^ ( ; !) = (!)n ! ; 8 g. Recall that if a state (x; ) is in the core, then is consistent by de…nition, and therefore, such a measure exists. Denote the measure space associated witĥ
! are the proportions that maximize the CRS production technology y ! , and (ii)
Theorem 2 (Core equivalence): Let Assumptions A1-A4 and B1-B3 hold for this Berglas economy. Then, every equilibrium is in the core. If also Assumptions A5 and A6 are imposed, then the core coincides with the set of equilibria.
We leave the proof of Theorem 2 for Section 6. We incorporate to the proof of EGSZ (1999, Theorem 5.1) the private goods production side. For that, we must accommodate the total production of private goods in order to …nd prices
, that separate the two constructed convex cones. But our main di¢ culty is to show that the there exists a measurable
What is important to see here is that without Assumption A6 the mapping py ! ( ) of H ! into R + fails to be countably additive and, therefore, the existence of a Radon-Nykodyn derivative ! (p; ! ; ) is not guaranteed (see Hildebrand (1968) ! and n ! (by letting n ! = ! n ! ). The …rst argument (the proportions ! ) enter into the consumer's budget constraint through the wages ! (p; ! ) due to our Assumption A3 (CRS production technology), and therefore the proportions ! can be used as a direct argument of U h . The second argument (the level of congestion n ! ) enter as a direct argument of U h , since the primitive utility functionũ h depends on n ! (by Assumption B3). Notice that the identities of the other consumers making use of the jurisdiction public goods do not appear in
, consistent with our assumption B3 (anonymous crowding).
Index of heterogeneity:
Let us now propose the following index of heterogeneity (H) in a jurisdiction:
The heterogeneity in a jurisdiction can be classi…ed as follows. We say that a community is mixed (or heterogeneous) when there is at least more than one consumer type in it, that is, there exists ( ; 0 ) with 6 = 0 such that I ! ( ; 0 ) 6 = 1:
We denote the pro…le of proportions of a heterogeneous community ! HET by Equilibrium comparative statics: An (endogenous) su¢ cient condition for the formation of a heterogeneous community is that, for every consumer h and every type of homogeneous jurisdiction ! HOM ( ) ;
This condition is endogenous to the model, as it depends on equilibrium variables, such as equilibrium prices. A more intuitive (endogenous) condition could be obtained if one considered a separable utility function 14 of the form
Then, an (endogenous) su¢ cient condition for the formation of a heterogeneous community ! HET is that, for every consumer h and every type of homogeneous jurisdiction ! HOM ( ) ;
where x h 2 arg max u h x; h ( ; ! ) such that BC h (!) holds, given the pair (y ! ; ! ): (ESC2) guarantees that the loss in utility from not consuming the most (NC1) Labor skills must be di¤erent among consumers.
Condition (NC1) is necessary. To see this, we can think of an economy with 14 Assumption A5, which guarantees that private goods are essential (Mas-Colell (1980)), excludes separability between private and local public goods. Guilles and Scotchmer (1997) show that the "essentiality of private goods"assumption can be dispensed with if one considers instead the assumptions "exhaustion of blocking opportunities" and "e¢ cient scale".
anonymous crowding where all types of consumers have identical labor skills but di¤erent preferences on public goods. These consumers cannot increase their utility by producing in an industry with a production technology based on labor complementarities, and therefore the consumers will be better o¤ in the standard homogeneous Tiebout communities.
(NC2) Labor complementarities in the production of private goods, i.e., there exists a production technology y 2 Y such that
In the absence of a collaborative production process, the well known result that homogenous groups coalesce around like individuals will apply in an economy with anonymous crowding. See Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) for this result and McGuire (1991) for a detailed normative analysis on this issue.
We …nish with a su¢ cient condition on the primitives that assures that, if there are two types of consumers moving from a homogeneous jurisdiction to an heterogeneous jurisdiction that experience su¢ ciently rich increments in their marginal productivities (due to the complementarities in the joint production process), then mixed communities will form in equilibrium. In Proposition 1
we restrict to the simplest scenario of a one good production economy, although there can be several goods transacted in this economy. This assumption is needed in order to associate the consumer's wage with his marginal productivity in production, but where prices are absent (since the price of the produced good can be normalized to one). 
for all h ; h 0 2 H, and such that the weighted productivity increment
e l + max
Condition (SC) says that the weighted increase in productivity from a state composed by homogeneous jurisdictions (! and ! 0 ) to another state composed by an heterogeneous jurisdiction ( !) must be enough to pay for: 1) the consumption increment " > 0, 2) the highest productivity between the two types of consumers when producing in homogeneous communities, weighted by the proportions of this type of consumer in the heterogeneous community !, 3) the double of the highest individual good endowment weighted by the highest proportion of consumer types in !, and 4) the highest possible per capita cost in terms of one good required to constitute the jurisdiction !.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is that mixed communities are optimal and exist in equilibrium if there exists two types of consumers with a consumption increment " > 0 satisfying (SC), and for whose gains from labor complementarities (through higher wages) outweigh the cost (in utility terms) of not consuming the most preferred public goods in the jurisdiction. Observe that the su¢ cient condition in Proposition 1 is obtained only on the primitives of our economy, and that the pair (x; x 0 ) can be any pair of consumption bundles, not necessarily the equilibrium ones. Also notice that Proposition 1 does not assert that the heterogeneous communities that form in equilibrium will be of type !, neither says which will be the equilibrium consumption bundle.
The following examples demonstrates that condition (SC) is not necessary for the existence of optimal heterogeneous communities; it is only a su¢ cient condition. Also, the example illustrates the group composition problem that arises when wages depend on a pro…le of di¤erent types of labor and consumers have di¤erent tastes for public goods.
Example 1: Let there be two types of consumers, = 1; 2, with the same measure for each type, i.e., 1 =
2
: There is only one perfectly divisible good, the price of which is 1. Good endowments are e 1 = 3 and e 2 = 2;
respectively. Let us consider three types of jurisdiction, ! 1 = (g 1 ; y S ; (2; 0)); ! 2 = (g 2 ; y S ; (0; 2)) and ! 3 = (g 3 ; y C ; (1; 1)): For tractability, we assume n ! = 2, for all ! = ! 1 ; ! 2 ; ! 3 , so congestion is not a decisive factor to discriminate among jurisdiction types. The production technology y C is collaborative, with the following form: y C = 20 p n 1 n 2 . The labor inputs of the production technology y S are perfect substitutes, with functional form y S = 3n 1 + n 2 : The equilibrium wages are 
For these parameters there is no " > 0 that satis…es (SC). However, heterogeneous communities of type ! 3 will form in equilibrium. 15 Prices are p = 1; ! = 1 . This is because wages are higher in ! 3 than in both ! 1 and ! 2 due to the labor complementarities in the production technology y C : Thus, we can conclude that the core is characterized by heterogeneous communities with pro…le (n 1 ; n 2 ) = (1; 1): Consistency holds by making (! 3 ) = . Assumption A6 holds for our restricted set of jurisdiction types. Thus, by Theorem 2, we know that the core coincides with the set of equilibria. Therefore, we can claim that, for this example, the Berglas equilibrium is characterized by heterogeneous Tiebout communities of type ! 3 = (g 3 ; y C ; (1; 1)).
Final remarks
Visa permits and pricing: Each member evaluates a visa m = ( ; !) through the corresponding personalized membership price q ! t ! + p ! ! (tax net of wage). The pricing of visas in our framework is more complex than it would be in a standard local public good economy, as the tax system depends on the community composition, but also the wages depend on the labor complementarities of the workers in the jurisdiction industry. Observe that it may occur that, even if t ! + p ! > 0; we have q ! < 0 (negative visa price), as the wage more than compensates the tax payment. In this sense, the wage ! can be seen as a lump-sum premium (or subsidy) paid to the consumer for his good (bad) labor complementaries with the other consumers of his jurisdiction. Below, in our generalized game (Section 6), the personalized membership price q ! is decomposed 15 If endowments were e 1 = 3=2 and e 2 = 2 instead, then there is an " > 0 that satis…es (SC), and ! 3 is preferred by both consumer types, since U 1 (! 1 ; 1; 0; 1; 3) = 0:62, Our main focus here is to analyze the Berglas'"group composition problem"as it was initially conceived, where these types of externalities were not present.
Spatial considerations are absent in our model. However, space could be incorporated by assigning a location to every possible jurisdiction (following Konishi (2008)). In such a spatial Berglas'economy, any two jurisdictions that are suf…ciently close geographically may have some residents in one jurisdiction that bene…t from the public goods of the other jurisdiction. Such behavior has been avoided in all previous Tiebout literature by assuming that every jurisdiction has the capacity to expel "illegal consumers"("exclusion"). In this sense, we are also accepting this assumption in order to guarantee e¢ ciency. If this assumption were absent, then the pricing would be ine¢ cient, as it would not capture the externalities imposed by those commuters. Recovering e¢ ciency without the exclusivity assumption is an interesting line of investigation, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
Tastes and skills: Assumption B2 is essential for Theorem 2 to hold true since skills (or endowments) act as an e¢ cient …scal discriminatory device among consumers, because such characteristics are linked in a one-to-one relationship with the consumers' tastes for public goods. This assumption might be justi…ed in certain cases. For example, one could think that individuals that have been assigned a certain type of job in the industry are prone to demand speci…c health services. Individuals with di¤erent working conditions (say, miners and engineers) will demand di¤erent public health services, and thus will be taxed di¤erently. If signaling (through skills or endowments) does not exist, then an equilibrium for this Berglas economy is not e¢ cient. The best hope in such a scenario is a Lindahl pricing scheme.
17 17 A more sophisticated approach could then be taken. In particular, one could seek to make 20 We observe that Assumption B2 can be relaxed in a novel way.
Assumption B2
0 : Consumers of the same type are assigned the same endowments, skills, and tastes for public goods, but may have di¤erent preferences for private goods. Also it is fair to mention here the paper Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975) , which is a more modern version of the Debreu (1952) social existence theorem. Schafer and Sonnenschein proved that a competitive equilibrium exists also for abstract skills an endogenous choice as in Conley and Wooders (2001) . We refer to the original paper for such a re…nement.
economies with interdependent, price-dependent and non-ordered preferences.
The continuum extension: The three approaches (core, non excess demand and simultaneous optimization approach) were initially conceived for an exchange economy with a …nite number of agents. The extension of the core approach to an atomless local public good economy was done by Kaneko and Wooders (1986) .
Since then, Wooders and coauthors have further enriched the model in many di¤erent ways using the f-core notion. The application of the non-excess demand approach to an atomless club economy was done by EGSZ (1999). For this EGSZ (1999) followed the pioneering works of Aumann (1964 Aumann ( , 1966 . In the present paper we not only provide the …rst equilibrium existence proof for a club / local public good economy using a generalized game, but also carry out this analysis in the continuum of agents framework. Most of our extensions follow by application of results. It is worth noting that the technique of proving existence of equilibrium in a nonatomic economy using a generalized game has been useful in the incomplete markets literature (see for example, Araujo, Orrillo and Páscoa (2000) and Araujo and Páscoa (2002) ). However, this technique has never been applied to a local public goods nonatomic economy.
Puri…cation: Finally, we wish to stress that our puri…cation result also departs from earlier works on club / local public good economies. The discreteness of the set of public projects (in the sense of Ellickson (1979) and Mas-Colell (1980)) requires a continuum of agents in order to convexify agents'strategy sets. However, puri…cation of players'mixed strategies cannot be done using Schmeidler's (1973) 
Generalized game and proofs
Theorem 1 is proved assuming that assumption B2 0 holds. Throughout the proof we discuss how the proof can be modi…ed if assumption B2 applies instead.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We …rst construct a generalized game for a Berglas'economy and prove that it has an equilibrium. Then, we show that such equilibrium is, in fact, an equilibrium.
The generalized game: In the generalized game a player k chooses his strategy s(k) parameterized by the other agents'strategies s k . For this economy the game is played by the consumers and four additional auctioneers. We divide the consumers'optimization problem into two stages.
Stage 1 : Consumer h chooses his most preferred consumption bundle for a given jurisdiction membership m = ( ; !) with h ( ; !) = 1:
Observe that the terms in BC h (!) are all multiplied by h ( ; !); but we omit it as we know that h ( ; !) = 1 (the consumer is evaluating his utility at this speci…c jurisdiction type). Let us denote consumer h 's demand correspondence for private goods at jurisdiction ! by (h ; !) fargmax u h ; h ( ; !) :
has a measurable graph (see Hildebrand (1974, p . 59, Proposition 1.b)).
Commodity prices can be shown to be positive. The usual procedure is to build a truncated economy by adjoining a few agents of each type with utilities linear in the consumption of the private good. For this truncated economy, the prices of private goods and memberships belong to compact sets. Using a feasibility argument we can show that commodity prices are positive along the sequence. Then, we can apply Fatou's lemma to show that the sequence of truncated economies has an equilibrium, independent of the truncation (the measure of the set of arti…cial adjoined agents goes to zero). For simplicity, we omit this procedure and refert to EGSZ (1999).
Claim 1: (h ; !) has nonempty convex compact values and is continuous. Stage 2 : Given their optimal consumption bundles, consumers choose their most preferred jurisdiction type (notice that the consumer being alone in a ju-
Then, h ( ; !) = 1 for ! 2 arg max U h !; p; t ! ; ! ; ! . We represent the pure strategy of consumer h by a basis vector of dimension : The vector
is the vector in R with 1 as ! th coordinate and zero otherwise.
denotes the marginal productivity of a type consumer evaluated at the crowding pro…le n ! 2 2 N + :
Auctioneer 2 chooses a poll fee ! 2 R L + common to all individuals in the jurisdiction ( ! = ! ; 8 2 ) such that it covers the cost of providing the jurisdiction public project, i.e., min f g
Auctioneer 3 chooses a vector of prices ft ! g 2 ;!2 ; with t ! 2 Trans; in order
Claim 2: Auctioneers 1, 2, and 3's strategy sets are nonempty, convex, and compact.
Proof: Strategy sets are convex since ! ; ! and t ! belong to the real numbers, for all and !. Transfers are bounded,
The term
. This implies that Auctioneer 1's strategy set is compact. The lower bound on the lump-sum transfers is T ( ) = minf0; max
The argument is well known. If some consumers are paying large negative lumpsum transfers, then others must be paying large positive lump-sum transfers, which implies that some transfers are canceled with some others (for t ! 2 Trans).
Hence, Auctioneer 3's strategy set is compact. Finally, notice that poll taxes are bounded since pc (g ! ) =n ! is a …nite constant component, and c (g ! ) 0 is bounded from above by assumption. Hence, Auctioneer 2's strategy set is compact.
Auctioneer 4 chooses p in 4 L 1 in order to make the aggregate excess demand as expensive as possible, i.e., max
Claim 3: (p) is bounded below, upper hemicontinuous, and convex-valued.
Proof: The compact-valued correspondence h ! (h ; !; p) is bounded below by 0 and above by the integrable function h ! (
We have p l > 0; 8l. According to p. 62, Theorem 2), R
. And according to p. 73, Proposition 7) this set, which is bounded below by 0, is also compact. De…nition GGE: An equilibrium for the constructed generalized game consists of a vector of bundles and memberships ( x; ) and a vector of prices ( p; t; ; ) such that each player k chooses a strategy s(k) to solve his respective optimization problem parameterized in the other players'actions s k .
Proposition 2:
There exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies for the constructed generalized game.
Proof: Note that a consumer's strategy of choosing his most preferred jurisdiction type in stage 2 has a …nite and discrete space domain ; since the set of consumer types, the set G of public projects, the set N N + of consumers 25 pro…les, and the set Y of production technologies are …nite (and thus discrete).
In order to circumvent this problem, we extend our generalized game to allow for consumers' mixed strategies in the set of jurisdiction types. Let us denote
(!) = 1g: Then, ( ) stands for the convex hull of (1; :::; !; :::; ); which is the set of mixed strategies for each consumer. A pro…le of strategies : H ! ( ) brings the continuum of consumers into strategies (pure or mixed).
Consumer h 's stage 2 optimization problem extended to mixed strategies is such that this consumer randomizes over the possible consumptions in the di¤er-ent jurisdiction types. We write U h ; p; t ! ; ! ; ! u h ( P ! (!) (h ; !); ). That is, consumer randomizes in = f1; :::; g, but not directly in consumption bundles. Then, consumer h 's stage 2 maximization problem is max 2 ( ) U h ( ; p; t ; ; ): The utility u h ( P ! (!) (h ; !); ) is a continuous bounded real valued function on P ! (!) (h ; !), and the mixed strategy belongs to the convex compact set ( ): R(h ) = f 2 ( ) : 2 arg max U h ; p; t ; ; g denotes the set of mixed strategies that solve consumer h 's second stage maximization problem.
We must extent the …ctitious auctioneers' problems to allow for consumers' mixed strategies. Given a mixed strategy pro…le : H ! ( ) and the vector of consumers' demand for commodities evaluated in their optimal jurisdiction membership, ( (h ; h ( ; !)) h 2H , we can rewrite the continuous linear function of Auctioneer 4 in terms of mixed strategies as follows
Objective functions (p) and 0 (p) are obtained by aggregating consumers' budget constraints. While for 0 (p) it is in terms of consumers'mixed strategies, (p) holds for pure strategies. (p) and 0 (p) are equivalent in a degenerate equilibrium if consistency holds and pro…ts are zero (we will prove below that consistency and zero pro…ts actually hold in equilibrium).
Auctioneer 1, 2, and 3's objective functions extended to mixed strategies become, respectively,
Observe that for Auctioneer 4's objective function we could have written P
All the conditions of Debreu's (1952) theorem hold. Thus, we can assert that the extended generalized game has an equilibrium, possibly in mixed strategies.
At this point it remains to show that a degenerate equilibrium of the extended generalized game is, in fact, an equilibrium of the original game.
Proposition 3:
The generalized game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. and keep all the equilibrium conditions satis…ed. In fact, once this replacement is done, payo¤ functions (p) and 0 (p) can easily be shown to be equivalent. The indicators that the atomic auctioneer takes as given evaluated at^ are still the same as when they were evaluated at : Therefore,^ is a degenerate equilibrium pro…le.
Notice that if we had assumed instead that consumers of the same type have the same preferences for private goods (Assumption B2), then we would have a common best response ( ; !) instead of one (h ; !) for each consumer h of this type. In that case, Schmeidler's (1978) puri…cation result could be applied, since we could write R 19 Schmeidler's (1973) puri…cation result cannot be applied, as it requires a common best demand response for all consumers of the same type. 20 In fact, our framework is even simpler than the Páscoa (1998) and Araujo and Páscoa is such that
But then, this strict inequality enters into contradiction with the solution to Auctioneer 4's maximization problem.
Observe that the market auctioneer's problem is now max fpg 00 (p), where
. We now show that there is no commodity excess demand. Suppose there is excess demand of commodity l. Then, the price auctioneer sets p l equal to 1, but then the whole function 00 (p) becomes positive, a contradiction with the aggregation of the budget constraints.
Commodities markets clear. Suppose not, that is,
Then, the market auctioneer chooses p l su¢ ciently close to zero, which would make l (h ) hit the bound U; for every individual, a contradiction with feasibility.
From Auctioneers 1, 2, and 3's optimization problems in the generalized game, we have py ! ((n ! ) 2 ) = P ! n ! and 
28 ! e < 0: But then, at such preferred optimum, the aggregation of consumers' budget constraints holds with strict inequality, a contradiction to market clearing and
It remains to check that consumers are optimizing, that is, if (x
We show that a quasi-equilibrium is an equilibrium by contradiction. Suppose that the quasi-equilibrium ((x; ); (p; t; ; )) is not an equilibrium. Let there be a nonnull set of consumers who are quasioptimizing but not optimizing. For each such consumer h ; there is a choice Pareto e¢ ciency immediately follows by lettingH equal the whole population of consumers H.
We now prove that, if in addition Assumption A6 is imposed in our Berglas economy, then any core state (x; ) can be supported as an equilibrium. Let us denote the consumer h 's preferred set by
Since a consumer h can choose at most one membership, say = ( ; !) with j j = 1; we write ( ) = c(g ! )=n ! . Let us be more explicit 22 As EGSZ (2006) point out, this more restricted form of the consumption sets just requires us to be more careful than EGSZ (1999) in the distinction between a quasi-equilibrium and equilibrium.
in notaion and denote the consumer h 's wage function at jurisdiction ! by
Observe that the correspondence is measurable if the functions ! (p; ! ; ) and e ( ) are measurable. The measurability of e ( ) is guaranteed by assumption. It remains to check that the function ! (p; ! ; ) is measurable.
By Assumption A6, the mapping py ! ( ) of H ! into R + is countably additive and dominated by (since is absolutely continuous with respect to ). Also, py ! (;) = 0. Thus, by the theorem of Radon-Nykodyn, there exists a measurable
; for any given setĤ ! 2 H ! and any price p (see Hildebrand (1968) . This in turn implies the equilibrium condition of no-pro…ts in the production of private goods. Now, observe that the production possibility correspondence y ! of H ! into R L is compact and convex (by Assumption A3(i) and the …niteness of the measure )
. Then, it follows that there exists a Radon-Nykodym derivative of y ! (Ĥ ! ) with respect to measure (see Hildebrand (1968) ). That is, there exists a correspondence Condition (C) implies that py ! (Ĥ ! ) < 1 for all !, and thus ! (p; ! ; ) can be chosen as an integrable function ofĤ ! in R + (see Hildebrand (1968) ).
We now show that almost every consumer chooses in their budget sets. Denote by ! ( h ( ; !)) the poll tax paid at jurisdiction ! when membership h ( ; !): ! ; ! g max l;~ e~ l max l c l (g ! )=n ! > ": Let us denote this condition by (SC ). Thus, the state ( x; ) is feasible under wages ( ! ) = ; 0 and improves upon (x; ), contradicting the assumption that a state composed only by homogeneous communities is in the core. Hence, the core must be composed by heterogeneous communities.
In this economy equilibrium exists (guaranteed by Assumptions A1-A5 and B1-B3) and is characterized by heterogeneous communities (Theorem 2 holds since we assumed A6) if condition (SC ) holds. We know that in equilibrium, 
